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Thispaperexplores thedevelopment andtransformation ofa local coUective
campaign oppoJing the U.S. A"'!Y's ChemicaL Weapons Stockpile
Disposal Program into a social movement with national andinternational
dimensions. I examine the wqys in which the actions of both citizens and
the Army have been shaped I!J oiJiciaLs, policies and o~alJizations at
muLtiple levels ofthestate. Contrary to theemphasis 011 extra-institutional
actions noted in many studies of movements and coLlective action, I show
that thesoaal; politicaL andscientific context of technical controversies with
the state m~ place constraints upon and opportunities for action to be
directed and sustained through institutionaL channels. Specifically, I
explai» the effects ofpoliticaL opportsnities, "taTl,et vuLnerabilities" (Walsh
1986) and specialized resources on the develop/Rent and transformation of
cLoims-llJaking, forms ofaction,or;ganizationaL structure and the expressed
aims ofthegroups involved. I endwith suggestionsforpractica! distinctions
andrefinements in theconcepts used in theanalYsis.
Technical controversies are inherently political (Mazur 1981;
Levine 1982; Nelkin 1984; Powell 1984; Jasper 1988; Clarke 1990;
Portney 1991; Benford, Moore and Williams 1993; Walsh, Warland and
Smith 1993). Since 1970, government regulations over issues of
technology and the environment have greatly increased at federal, state
and local levels. Citizen protection against environmental hazards and
the implementation of controversial technologies has, consequently,
depended primarily on government controls (Kraft and Vig 1990).
Challengers in technical controversies must often become enmeshed in
* Dr. Jack Weller's sharp insights have been especially helpful for the development of this
work. I am also greatly indebted to the anonymous interviewees, without whom this research
would have been rather stale and uniformed. This research was supported by a Grant-in-Aid
of Research from SigmaXi, TheScientijic Research Society.
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institutional politics (see Levine 1982; Gibbs 1982) in order to advance
claims and influence decisions. This is especially true in controversies
over projects planned by offices of the state. Challengers' ability to
advance their claims within institutional channels can be significantly
affected by organizational resources such as money, skills, information,
and technologies that enhance, for instance, the dissemination of
information, legal, political or scientific expertise and organizational
structure (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gerlach 1983; Oliver and Marwell
1992). But, important factors also lie with opportunities external to
groups (farrow 1994, p.8S). Political opportunities in the form of
policies, influential allies and state agencies that strengthen challengers'
claims can be particularly crucial for understanding how action is shaped
through institutional channels and in explaining outcomes in technical
controversies. .
Broadly, I ask whether controversies over issues of technology
and environment involving .programs planned by the state, are shaped by
influences that may establish similar trajectories of emergence and action
across the range of these controversies. Rather than collective action
emerging outside the confines of institutional channels, as is suggested by
political process analyses (farrow 1994, 1989; Tilly 1978; Lo 1992), my
study suggests that protest in technical controversies may tend to develop
within and remain focused on institutionally mandated channels for
political participation. This is due, in large part, to state policies and
regulatory mechanisms, actions of political officials and occasions for
public participation that both constrain and enable the actions of
challengers and the challenged in several ways.
Specifically, this paper examines the interaction between citizens and
the state through successive phases of the controversy over the United
States' Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. I focus on the manner in
which political opportunities created by state policies, influential allies
and actions by agencies of the state at various levels have shaped the
actions and claims-making of both the movement and the Anny. I
explain the factors that led to the emergence of the citizens' challenge to
the Anny's proposal and the initial dimensions of political opportunity.
Then, by describing multiple phases of the controversy I show how the
initial dimensions of opportunity changed over the course of the dispute
and why transformations in strategies the movement pursued emerged as
it developed from a localized controversy to a social movement with
national and intemational ties and implications. I describe the way in
which federal guidelines associated with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) provided a framework that conditioned the
actions and claims-making of citizens, political officials, the Army and
other agencies of the state in their attempts to influence the trajectory of
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the disposal program. I explain the movement's adjustments to changes
in dimensions of opportunity, associated changes in strategies toward an
emphasis on marshalling specialized resources such as technical experts
and scientific data, and their effects on the claims and actions of the
movement and its organizational arrangements. I also address the effects
of human errors and technical problems associated with the disposal
program on both the Army's and the movement's claims-making and
actions.
Conceptualizing, understanding and explaining political opportunity
is central to the analysis. But as Gamson and Meyer (1996, p.275) have
noted, "the concept of political opportunity...is in danger of becoming a
sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement
environment." In this paper political opportunities is used as a
sensitizing concept that illuminates a number of influences on the
citizens' challenge to the disposal program. I take the position that
opportunities can emerge in many forms and the influence they have on
the actions and development of movements is variable. The assumption
is thatin some cases it is quite possible that political opportunity may not
exist in a readily definable fonn or may fail to provide a robust
explanation for movement actions. Consequently, the existence and
importance .of political opportunity for analyzing and explaining
movement actions may best be left open to explanation in relation to the
particularities of a specific case or sets of cases. Attempts at broad
generalization runs the risk of quickly overstepping the bounds of the
concept's explanatory potency.
As this case shows, focusing on dimensions of political opportunity
is useful not only for analyzing broad movements or national cycles of
protest, but also the developments of localized controversies into social
movements. Examining case-specific particularities of political
opportunity allows for practical refinements and distinctions to be made
among the broad dimensions of opportunity described by Tarrow (1996,
1994, 1989) Tilly (1978) and others. The technical nature of the
controversy and the institutional channels through which .action may be
directed are especially important for understanding political opportunities
and collective action in this case.
Political Opportunities, Target
Vulnerabilities and Repertoires of Action
Tarrow (1994, p.8S) suggests that political opportunities are
"dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for
people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for
success or failure" in gaining political leverage for their claims.
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Dimensions of opportunity vary at different levels, across localities and
among agencies and levels of the state1(farrow 1994, p.18). Opportunity
may expand as access to political participation increases, reform
legislation is approved, political alignments shift, influential allies are
coopted or as the aims of officials and agencies conflict, both within and
between levels of the state (farrow 1994, pp.85-89; also see Walton
1992). The fluid character of political opportunities makes "more solid
res~ur~es" import~t, for they enhance a movement's capacity to
capitalize on emergtng opportunities and "prevent [others1from slipping
away" (farrow 1994, p.99). Three are particularly important claims that
legitimate collective action, a flexible repertoire of action and
organizational structures that guide interaction by actors at the
movement's base, while maintaining interaction with allies and opponents
(farrow 1994). Each of these was significant in the development of the
dispute over the disposal program.
Particularly relevant to the emergence of opportunities in technical
controversies are "target vulnerabilities" (Walsh 1986). Walsh suggests
that a target's "own human and technological weaknesses" can expose
problem.s aroun~ which .critical claims can be made or that may
substantiate clauns ~reV1ously made about the technology being
challenge~: Exposmg these weaknesses can expand political
opporturunes for challengers by de-legitimating opponent's claims to
authority or providing incentives for political actors and allies to
intervene.f Both human errors and technical problems associated with
the Anny and the disposal program have had significant influences on
the movement's claims-making and actions.
Mobilizing movement participants and influencing state actors and
agencies is most often carried out through forms of collective action that
address state systems in ways that will be acknowledged and compel
response (filly 1978; Cable and Benson 1993; Tarrow 1994).
Challenge~s have access to and often combine a variety of existing forms
of collective action. The shifting character of political opportunities
1 Th~ state i~ understood here as a multi-dimensional ensemble of actors, agencies and
~ffices Interacttng at many levels and across localities. Its policies are often contested and
influenced by a complex of competing interests. This multi-dimensional form can provide
numer~us ta~gets for claims-making, potential allies and points of access that facilitate
collective action.
2 It is also quite conceivable that in certain situations unsubstantiated claims of the
challengers could have the reverse effect. As with political opportunity, target vulnerability
shoul~ be understo.od as a sensitizing concept that aids the researcher in formulating
questions about particular cases and series of collective actions.
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favors a flexible repertoire that changes through innovation, imitation of
other groups, and as participants, interests, opportunities and goals
change (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994; Turner and Killian [1957] 1987). The
fluid and emergent grounds on which movements develop (Weller 1994)
push conventional forms of action to repeatedly be "redeployed, tinkered
with and combined" (farrow 1994, p.11.4). One of the foremost
challenges for movement organizers then "is to create organizational
models that are sufficiendy robust to stand up to opponents, but flexible
enough to change with new circumstances, [favor a flexible repertoire of
action] and draw on energies at the base (farrow 1994, p.136)."
The focus on political opportunities, target vulnerabilities and
repertoires of action is particularly useful for understanding the
institutional channeling of action that characterizes this technical
controversy. There are a multiplicity of social, political and scientific
issues inherent to. technical controversies to which challengers may
address opposition toward projects and shape their design and
implementation. To push their claims challengers must, to some extent,
maneuver within institutional channels" with respect to government
controls that shape decision-making processes involving controversial
technologies. These institutional channels provide initial points of access
to decision-makers among multiple agencies and levels of the state that
can be exploited to challenger's own ends. In addition, once the
technical nature of a dispute has been ~ven legitimacy by the agencies
and officials involved in the dispute, decision-makers are moved to act
on the basis of technical evidence. Challengers are then faced with the
task orienting their repertoire of action toward assembling and presenting
technical evidence to justify their claims. Here target vulnerabilities may
become especially significant for legitimating opposition by providing
key empirical referents that further problematize the development of the
project and technology being challenged. As this case ·shows, these
dimensions of technical controversy may be critical for explaining the
development, transformation and endurance of collective action in these
disputes. .
Data and Methods
Data were gathered from all available secondary sources to verify
accounts of actions and events over the course of the controversy.
Newspaper reports and publications of citizens I groups, environmental
organizations, U.S. Anny and other federal agencies supplement primary
data from interviews and field observations. Over 500 news articles
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from local, regional and nationally distributed newspapers- were
collected, providing the chronological ordering of events and actions and
indications of the media's portrayal of the controversy over time.
Newsletters, infonnational packets and reports produced by citizens
groups in Kentucky, Utah, Maryland, the Pacific Islands and Russia were
also used. These documents yielded information on the discursive
framing (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986) of the controversy
by the groups, strategies, actions, resources and foci of action at different
periods of the controversy. Reports and newsletters of larger
environmental groups, such as Greenpeace USA, Sierra Club, National
Toxics Coalition, the Government Accountability Project, and the
Kentucky Resources Council and private correspondences between these
groups and local organizations were also used. These documents helped
to indicate sources of modifications in the action repertoire of the
opposition, claims-making and resources, as well as evidence of the social
and org~zational networks in which local challengers were located
during the controversy. Documents produced by the U.S Anny, the
National Research Council, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the
Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records provided
important information on the expressed positions various state
organizations, interactions among them, regulatory constraints they faced
and data used to support their claims."
Intensive interviews were done between June 1994 and May 1995
with seventeen key participants in the citizens' groups challenging the
disposal program. Interviewees were among the most active members in
the Kentucky groups, as well as the broader coalitional networks
influencing the movement. They provided infonnatioo on intra-
organizational discourse, changes in repertoires of action, bases for
transforming the organizational structure of the movement and the types
of resources embedded in the networks of participants from which the
movement drew, especially in the initial phases of the controversy. As
principal participants throughout multiple phases of the controversy,
their accounts are vital for understanding these influences on the
3 Arti~les were collected from The Richmond Register, The Berea Citizen, The Eastem Pro.gress,
The Lexington Herald-Leader, The Courier JotmlOi, The Cincimtoti Entptirer, The Baltimore Sun, The
Oregonian, TheNt!1II York Timesand The Washington Post.
.. The conclusions reached are necessarily confined to assessment of issues, actions and
developments as captured by media representations, institutional discourse and action and
the discourse and actions of movement organizations as expressed in their document: and
the views of a limited number of key participants. No attempt is made provide an
understanding or explanations regarding the ideas, perceptions, actions or interests of actors
or organizations beyond the discursive and documented representations afforded by the data.
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movement and provide a means to assess internal responses of the
groups to changes in dimensions of political opportunity. 5
Creating Opportunities. The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Reagan Years
Political interests and governmental regulations have significantly
shaped the chemical weapons disposal controversy by their impacts 00
the structure of political opportunities facing the citizen challengers.
Some of these influences can be traced back more than a decade before
the dispute began in Madison County, Kentucky.
During the 1970's environmental issues ·enjoyed intense public
interest leading to major federal policy revisions (Bosso 1991, p.155).
Congress set the stage for these innovations at the end of 1969 when it
passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, P.L. 91-190) (Vig
and Kraft 1990) requiring detailed environmental impact statements
(EIS) on any "major federal actions affecting the environmentII
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1970, p.525). During the next decade
detailed guidelines for EIS's were set out by the President's Council on
Environmental Quality (Kraft and Vig 1990, p.17; Wenner 1990). The
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Council on
Environmental Quality mandated that public hearings be provided for
citizen participation in developing environmental impact statements.
.These institutionally mandated hearings expanded points of access to
authorities by providing channels of communication and have
subsequently conditioned challenges to controversial technologies to
emerge within these hearings and to be shaped by the broad framework
of NEPA procedures.
Congress maintained a commitment to environmental issues
throughout the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations. However, by
the mid-eighties the Reagan administration had reduced the ability of
federal agencies to enforce environmental regulations (Vig 1990; Bosso
1991). Cutbacks in budgets and staffing and reductions in the scope of
5 Each interview was tape recorded and was approximately two hours in length. The
interviewees' observations represent a relatively small proportion of individuals involved in
the issue and mayor may not fully reflect others' perceptions of events. However, the
interviewees were among those in positions to know of and understand important factors
behind the actions, strategies and discourse of the citizens' opposition and the influences
that helped to transform these throughout the controversy. It is quite probable tha.t those
interviewed ha.ve partially reconstructed their understandings of motives and occurrences in
light of later events. But by cross referencing these observations with the myriad secondary
sources gathered, as well as field notes and other interviews, this work reflects the history
and actions of the twelve-plus year controversy.
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authority for many federal agencies have led to increased autonomy of
state-level agencies and local govemments to set and enforce
environmental policy. A result has been the development of policies at
some state and local levels that surpass many federal regulations (Lester
1990): The Army's .announcement in 1984 of their proposal to incinerate
chemical weapons in Madison County, Kentucky and seven other sites
aro~nd the country" came in the midst of Reagan's devolution of
environmental policy development and enforcement.
Institutionalized Opportunities and Local Alliances
.. During the earliest phase of the controversy, actions of both the
cinzens and the Anny centered on the development of the required
Draft Pro~ammatic ~nviro~ental Impact Statement (Draft
~~~granu.natlcE!S) .. P~blic meetmgs required by NEPA policy provided
~~al points ?~ mstltutlonal access to political actors and occasions for
cinzens to critically assess the Army's proposal. Citizens in Madison
Coun~, Kentucky began to organize following the Army's first meeting
and allies at th~ local, county and state levels emerged. The actions of
~e nascent alliance resulted in the first set of delays for the' Anny's
disposal program.
Following NEPA requirements, the Anny set out in 1984 to
cons~ct a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the
~~e~cal weapons disposal program. The Draft Programmatic EIS is the
t.n1~al ~hase required ~ the development of a final EIS.. It allows a
project s s?onsor ~ penod to gauge public opinion and determine the
types of information needed to evaluate the possible environmental
effe~~ of the pr?ject and, con~equently, an opportunity for opponents to
mobilize. Meetmgs at ea<:h site ~~ed for an incinerator facility were
conducted .as th~ public parecipation component of the Draft
Program~atl~EIS (Federal Code of Regulations, 651.35 - 651.41, 1991).
The meetlng 10 Madison County on February 16, 1984 was crucial to the
emer~nce of local challenges to the Anny's plans for constructing a
c~emlcal weapons disposal facility at the Blue Grass Army Depot in
Richmond, Kentucky.
6 There are eight site . th . IUS h . .h . al SlOe contmenta .. were dlffenng percentages of the nation's
c ernie weapons stockpile is stored and slated for incineration facilities under the Anny's
proposed p~ans: Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland (S.Q4Vo); Anniston Anny
Depot, Anniston, Alabama (7.10/0); Lexington Blue Grass Anny Depot Richmond Kentucky(16°/0)· Newport Ann Amm .. "
: ' y urution Plant, Newport, Indiana (3.90/0); Pine Bluff Arsenal
Pine Bluff, Arkans:s (1200/0); Pu~blo Depot, Pueblo, Colorado (9.90/0); Tooele Anny Depot:
Tooele, Utah (423 Vo); and, UmatillaDepot, Umatilla,Oregon (11.60/0) (NRC 1994).
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Because of earlier incidents local concern about Army operations at
the Madison County storage facility existed prior to the meeting,
providing some incentive for local citizens to attend and question the
Army's proposal. Some of the 300 citizens in attendance questioned the
Army's representatives about the safety of incineration, alternatives to
on-site disposal and the possible future-uses of the facility after disposal
was completed. Competing claims were presented about the potential
options for dealing with the local stockpile. Incineration was touted by
the Army as the safest, most efficient and effective means of disposal.
But Kentucky officials, local politicians and several citizens, including
professors, physicians and. an environmental engineer were quick to
challenge, suggesting that alternatives were available. Army officials
appeared unprepared and uninterested in the citizens' concerns.
Impressions emerged that the Anny's plan was in fact compulsory rather
than open to discussion and change, as the Army had implied in calling
for public participation.
The institutionalized occasion' of the meeting allowed direct
interaction among Army spokespersons, citizens and political officials,
resulting in the emergence of a conceptual foundation for future action.
Citizens began to construct a discourse that was highly critical of the
Army and depot operations. "Public participation" was regarded as
flawed from the beginning by the Army's callous disregard of citizens'
concerns and its failure to view incineration as merely one of several
options for disposal. Citizens began to organize following the meeting.
Tilly (1978, pp.156-159) explains that "prevailing standards of rights
and justice" and citizens' prior experiences "govern the acceptability" of
various forms of action to both citizens and states. Most local citizens
involved in the first opposition group to be formed, Concerned Citizens
of Madison County (hereafter noted as Concerned Citizens), had little
experience in collective action. Many were, however, quite experienced
in local and state-level politics. Participants in the Concerned Citizens
assumed the political nature of the issue and acted in ways familiar to
them. Information about the Anny's proposal and legal approaches to
blocking the plan were sought. Local, state and some federal officials
were quickly contacted and urged to oppose the plan. The most publicly
visible actions of the Concerned Citizens during this period were
oriented towards participation in public meetings mandated by NEPA or
organized by political officials. Between meetings their focus moved to
lobbying strategies and legal approaches.
An alliance between the Concerned Citizens and some local, state
md federal officials emerged early in the controversy. The alliance
provided the Concerned Citizens early points of access to political allies
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.at multiple levels of the state. Within the first six months legislation was
written to impede the Army's gaining approval for necessary Kentucky
emissions permits, Local courts called for a congressional investigation
into the Army's proposal and established an ordinance banning chemical
weap~ns from ~a~so~ County. ~y June U.S. Congressman Larry
Hopkins, whose district mcluded Madison and surrounding counties had
organized the Ma~son County Task Force, a group staffed by iocal
citizens and officials to study the Army's proposal and make
recommendations to his office and the community.
Leaders of Concerned Citizens expressed confidence that these
actions, especially the Task Force, were important indications of
government support for l~cal ~oncen;t~ and reported a sense of efficacy
am?~g the. group regarding Its posinon and actions. Support from
political allies and the apparent efficacy of their actions would serve to
further the Concerned Citizens' focus on institutionalized means for
affecting the ~y's program. The Anny also helped to solidify this
focus. Anny discourse stressed on-site incineration as the preferred
method o~ ~isposal. But, it was repeatedly stressed that, as mandated by
NEP~, citizens' c?ncems would be influential in decision-making
regarding the project and alternatives to incineration would be
considered before action proceeded. A number of alternatives to on-site
incineration~ inclUding..tr~sportation of the Kentucky stockpile to a
prot~type disposal fac~ty m Tooele, .l!tah, we~ mentioned by Anny
officlals.as workable. Citizens and political officials began to emphasize
the opnon of transportation and .during the first months. of the
controversy a not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) position became central to
the local opposition.
Local opposition to on-site incineration prompted the Anny to delay
the release of th~ ..I?raft Programmatic EIS indefinitely. The delay
bolstered the credibility of the challengers' claims with local and state-
level political..offici~s and media. The delay also provided the
Con~emed Citizens tune to further consolidate support of political
of~aals and other allies. Poli~cal opposition to the program appeared
quite strong when, less th~ SIX months after the first public ineeting,
Congress suspended funding for the Kentucky facility. But, in
November 1984 the National Research Council recommended that the
Anny proceed with on-site incineration (National Research Council
1984).
~roughout 1985 an~ 1986 citizen participation remained high and
lobb~g efforts and public m~etings continued. For example, a meeting
organized by the Task Force ill January 1985 drew over 500 citizens to
listen to Army representatives present the National Research Council's
138
Citizen-State I nteraaion
recommendations and intensely question them for over two hours .
Incineration continued to be emphasized in the Army's. proposals, but
transportation was also presented by Army representatives as a w~rkable
alternative. Moreover, an Anny-commissioned study on disposal
technologies by the Arthur D. Little Company rele~sed ~ mid-1985
supported neutralization technology and indicated that l.tS estimated co~ts
were far below that of incineration. The report was Ulcongruous with
the Army's rationale for on-site incineration. As a result, a member of
the Concerned Citizens recalled that these differing claims meant for
citizens that, "...in the early period of about a year or so things weren't
~tting more clarified but were getting more obfuscated if anything"
(Ulterview6/7/94).
Competing claims about options for the Madison County stockpile
continued through 1986. In May 1986, the Madison County Task Fo~ce
released its own detailed report informed by data from commuruty
proposals, Anny risk analyses and prior research. ~n alternatives .to
incineration. The report recommended transportation, over on-SIte
incineration. It appeared to have little effect. On July 1, 1986, the Army
released their Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
supporting on-site incineration.
The Draft Programmatic EIS was not well received in Madison
County. The local hearing organized for the public release of the
document lasted over six hours (Hindman 1989). Citizens claimed that .
the Anny gave only cursory attention to transportation. The Concerned
Citizens brought legal experts in environmental law from the Kentucky
Resources Council and scientists from two regional universities who
made detailed comments highly critical of the Draft Programmatic EIS.
The critiques focused on the construction of the document, its
conceptual foundation and the technical procedures used to develop the
data on which the report was based (Hindman 1989, p.292). An
especially controversial topic was the programmatic orientation of the
EIS that failed to assess each site individually.7 In a subsequent
congressional field hearing on the disposal program, Congressman
Hopkins expressed a common criticism.
7 Programmatic reviews are encouraged "when programs are being considered for general
application (Code of Federal Regulations, 1991, section 651.12)." In effe~t this meant ~at
the Draft Programmatic EIS for the disposal program would be a ~nenc (pr~gr~attc)
approach to studying possible environmental impacts of the Ch~mlcal Stockpile Disposal
Program. No site, in spite of their unique features, would be re~l~wed alone. I.nstead the
approach was more akin to averaging or blending the c~~ractertstlcs of t.he vano~s target
communities and their environs into generic communities for compartson of impacts,
Hence, not only would the study be generic but the decisions made would apply across the
board as well.
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Translated into plain language 'programmatic' means the Anny took all eight sites
in the United states where chemical weapons are stored, lumped them together,
ran them through a computer, hired some consultants to interpret the results, and
then hired an expert in double talk and government euphemisms to write a report
hardly anyone could read, much less understand (franscript of Field hearings of
Investigations Subcommittee of House Armed Services Committee 7/25/86).
An attorney for the Kentucky Resources Council described the Draft
Programmatic HIS as conceptually flawed with significant gaps of
information; "so flawed that it [would be] impossible to patch it up
(Register 8/29/86)." Discrepancies between claims and actions of local
citizens, state political actors and the Anny were central issues of
contention.
During this early phase NEPA requirements provided an
institutional framework for citizen opposition to Anny's disposal
program. The Anny was bound to the phased process of -constructing
impact statements with mandated public input. Rather than extra-
institutional protest, actions of the Concerned Citizens were centered by
the institutionally mandated public forums, while lobbying activities.
dominated between meetings. Anny betrayal of assurances of public
participation became a central claim expressed in the public meetings and
corresponded with the view expressed by political officials and other
citizens.8 Transportation, Concerned Citizens' preferred option, was
encouraged by the Anny's repeated indications that it was a workable
alternative. Congressman Hopkins' Task Force furnished local citizens
with further opportunities to attempt to influence the decision-making
process regarding the Anny's plan. Consequently, public opposition to
the disposal program was quite strong in Madison County, but collective
action remained sporadic and limited to state legitimated forms of citizen
action (filly 1978, p.156).
Tarrow (1994, pp.106-114) suggests that nascent movements tend to
engage in disruptive, extra-institutional forms of action that, through
sustained . interaction with authorities, may develop into more
cooperative, institutionalized forms. In this controversy, however,
collective action began through institutionalized politics and channels, not
extra-institutional protest. Public hearings provided institutionalized
means of access to authorities and, ostensibly, to participation in
decision-making on plans for weapons disposal. The Anny was not
responsive to citizen concerns and the dispute was not resolved. As the
8 In this period, claims-making regarding the Atmy's plans concerned primarily the design of
the disposal program, specifically the programmatic orientation of the Draft Programmatic
EIS and on-site disposal, rather than the disposal technology to be employed.
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controversy proceeded, repeated failures of citizens' attempts to affect
decisions through channels for participation mandated by Congress and
NEPA procedures justified claims of Anny ~~sinterest in local co~cems.
Reports and testimony indicating th~ workability ~f sever~ al~ematlves. to
the Army's plans for stockpile disposal were influential in affecting
actions and claims-making. Incongruities in the Anny's stan~e opened
the Army to highly critical claims against .the proposed design .o.f th~
disposal program by both citizens and Of~~lalS. ~s a resul~ the clnz~ns
challenge gained an expanded set of political allies opposmg chemical
weapons incineration in Madison County.
Emergent Vulner~bilitiesand the Final Programmatic EIS
Following the release of the Draft Programmatic ~IS, th~ next step
for the Anny was to construct a Final Programma~c EnvlrolUDent~
Impact Statement (Final Progr~atic EI~): The. Ftnal Programmatic
EIS was intended to be the Anny s final decision on the technology to be
used and sites to be involved in the disposal program.
In early 1987 two new groups entered. the con~oversy. The Army
funded the formation of the Commuruty Review Team, a new,
independent, community-based study group supported by Anny finances
and research information, The group's purpose was to relay loc~
concerns about the disposal plan to the Anny as the Final Programmatic
EIS was developed. The contract signed with the Anny on January 23,
1987 "provided $116,000 for salaries, travel funds and consultants and
required a final report by September 30, 1Q87, to become"part. of the
Final Programmatic EIS then scheduled for January 1988 .(Hin~an
1989, p.293). Also, because of both geo~aphic an~ ideological
differences about ten Berea, Kentucky residents split from the
, . 9
Concerned Citizens to form Common Ground, based in Berea.
Common Ground's founders reportedly sought to create a more
participatory organization to involve more citizens in the controversy and
develop strategies to" complement those employed by the Concerned
Citizens.
Despite the emergence of these new organizations, 1987 .~as a year
in which citizen opposition might have declined. No new decisions were
9 The Blue Grass Army Depot in Madison County is located between Richmond and
Berea, Kentucky. Concerned. Citizens of Madison County was a Ri~hmond based group an~
reflected the historically conservative atmosphere of that community. Common Ground IS
based in Berea and likewise reflects the historically liberal tenor of the area. For more about
these differences see, William E. Ellis', H.E. Everman's and Richard D. Sears' 1985 book
MaJison CotmtJ: 200 Years in Retrospect.
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scheduled to be made on the chemical weapons disposal program during
the year. But, on January 28, 1987, three mechanical problems resulted
~ an atmospheric release of nerve agent at the Tooele, Utah, facility. As
~s ?ften the case with accidents involving complex technologies, the
incident was blamed primarily on operator error (perrow 1984).
However, federal investigators also found "numerous shortcomings in
the way. th~ whole nerve gas program was being run", criticizing
cornmurucanon between employees and superiors, deadline pressures,
lack of adequate supervision and delays in reporting similar incidents
(Herald-Leader 9/20/87).
~e Tooele incident was significant in two ways. First, days
followmg the release of the report on the incident in September, the
Anny called a public hearing in Madison County in an attempt to quell
public concerns over the event. The meeting provided an occasion for
local organizations to mobilize citizens at a time when none had been
previously scheduled. As a result, the frequency of Common Ground
meetings increased and meeting attendance grew. Second, the incident
again expanded the opposition's set of critical claims against the Anny.
New facts supported accusations of Anny negligence, mismanagement
and inadequate technology. Both Concerned Citizens and Common
Ground touted the incident as strong evidence against on-site
incineration in the highlypopulated area of Madison County, Kentucky.
. . Less than a month after the September, 1987, hearing on the Tooele
incident, the Anny-financed Community Review Team released their
report. It recommended air transport of the Madison County stockpile
to the Tooele, Utah site. Concemed Citizens and Common Ground
mem.bers expecte~. the report to be more influential with both Anny
offic~als and political policy-makers than the earlier report by the
Madison County Task Force. The expectation was inaccurate. The
Comm~ty.Review Team. provided a new channel for citizen-Army
communicanon and ostensibly a new means by which citizens could
affect the disposal program. But, in January 1988, the Anny released the
~inal ~rogrammatic EIS supporting on-site incineration for all eight sites,
including Madison County.
Following the release of the Final Programmatic EIS, Congressman
Hopkins called a public meeting to be held during a NEPA mandated
4S-day public comment period following the release of the document.
The comment period provided citizens time to organize action and the
public meeting provided the occasion, now quite familiar to the
challengers, in which to act. The January 29, 1988 meeting drew over
2,000 people who overwhelmingly expressed opposition to the Anny's
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decision. Following the hearing, the Army delayed indefinitely the final
Record of Decision on the project.
The hearing marked the beginning of a transfonnation in the politics
of the disposal program. Political allies were gained at the state-level as,
by mid-1988, many Kentucky officials from the Governor down were on
record opposing on-site incineration in Madison County. The Kentucky
General Assembly passed new legislation that allowed local fiscal courts
to prohibit construction or operation of incineration facilities within th~ir
jurisdictions and that classified chemical munitions as hazardous ~atenal,
requiring the Army to comply with federal and state-level regulations for
hazardous waste disposal.
Although the Anny's disposal program included. eight sites,
resistance remained confined to the local controversy in Kentucky.
Intense opposition at one site hadn't halted the Anny's programmatic
emphasis regarding the impact statements and federal budgetary
appropriations for the program rem~ed unch.anged. ~e Anny's 1~88
programmatic Final Record of Decision remained finn m the selection
of on-site incineration for allsites. NEPA policy and the Federal Code
of Regulations, however, includes provisions for Site-Specific EIS's if. the
sites involved in project can be shown to differ to an extent that might
confound programmatic conclusions. The institutional framew?~k of
NEPA continued to shape the actions of the Concemed Citizens,
Common Ground and their allies as they pressed the Anny to implement
the site-specific stage. The groups expressed the expectation that a new
assessment would clearly show that on-site incineration was not
appropriate for the highly-populated Madison County, Kentucky area.
Shortly after the release of the Programmatic Final ~cord. of
Decision, the Army announced that it would pursue stte-spe~lfic
statements for all sites. But, rather than thoroughly reevaluate preVIOUS
EIS's and options such as transportation or neutralization for each site as
the challengers had hoped, the Army explained that the Site-Speci~c EIS
would determine only the specific location at each depot on which the
incinerator facility would be constructed. Other options would be
considered only if new technical evidence was presented that warranted
reconsideration of on-site incineration.
Political support had expanded at different levels, sustaining action
in Kentucky by Concerned Citizens and Common Ground, but not
across the localities implicated in the disposal program. The Anny's
Final Record of Decision made clear that organized opposition to on-site
incineration at only one locale involved in the disposal program would
not halt the advance of the" disposal program.. The Anny had bounded
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Transportation of the NATO stockpile was claimed by the citizen
challengers to be a fundamental contradiction to the Anny'~ persistence
for the development of on-site incineration in the U.S. Th~ issue .opened
the Army to new criticisms that were amplified when, to April 1990,
"technical problems" and "safety considerations" at the )ohnsto~ Atoll
facility pushed the Army to delay further ac~on at the ei~t continental
incinerator sites (Herald-Leader 4/6/90; Richmond Register 4/6/90).
These developments were used by Common Ground and Concemed
Citizens to further claims opposing incineration in Madison County,
Kentucky.
But a report released by the U.S. General Accounting O£?,-~e in J.un~
1990 charged community opposition groups With impeding
implementation of the disposal program by forcing r~peate~ delays and
increasing costs of the program. Kentucky s ~~gent new
environmental regulations and lack of federal appropnat1ons for the
program were also cited as significant factors for the delays. In
Kentucky, the report brought public expressions. of resentme~t .and
indignation from citizens and local and state officials. Contradict1ons
between the claims and actions of agencies at the federal level and those
at the state and local levels were again apparent. The delays in the
disposal program could, however, also be explained by repeated operator
errors and technical problems at the Tooele and Johnston Atoll test
. facilities that made the Army vulnerable to critical claims-making
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u.s. stockpile of chemical mwut1ons. but the d~si~ of the Army's
program, specifically on-site inc~erat1o~. The tun~line of the U.S;-
Soviet agreement rested on the timely unplementat10n of the Anny s
existing design of the program.
Between 1988 and 1990 opposition to the disposal program had also
increased among the U.S. sites. Citizens in Indiana and ..Ma~land h~d
begun local organizing efforts. Residents o.f ~awau, Mi~ronesia,
Polynesia and the Marshall Islands were also beguuung to orgarnze .local
challenges to the Army over the transportation of th~ NATO stockpil~ to
Army's incineration facility on the Johnston Atoll to the. South P~c~fic.
The U.S.-Soviet accord had also prompted an expansion of cmzen
opposition to incineration in Russia. In . Kentucky, the Concerned
Citizens maintained their efforts locally, while Common Ground began
to expand their network of affiliations by interacting. with lar~r
environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, the National Toxics
Campaign Fund and the Citizens Clearinghouse for H~ardous. Waste.
These multiple affiliations would open access to new information and
resources for Common Ground to draw upon in addressing the Army's
technical claims for incineration.
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subsequent debate over the program (Davies 1995). Critical claims over
the construction of the Army's environmental impact. statements and the
option of transportation were no longer to be considered. Rather, only
evidence and claims regarding the complex technical aspects of the
program were given legitimacy by the Anny. Further action and claims
c~alle~ging the Aany's p~ans for disposal were to be limited largely to
scientific and technical issues regarding how best to incinerate not
whether t? do so. !fiis shift, in effect, diminished the expected impa~t and
op~orturubes pro:tded by the Site-Specific EIS request and prompted a
senes of changes in the forms of action, organization and claims-making
pursued by the Concerned Citizens, Common Ground and their allies.
Shifting Opportunities, Vulnerabilities
and the "Growth of Protest"
. In sum: .shift~ in the accessibility of institutional channels through
which the citizens challenge could be directed and the conditions under
which ~t coul~ take place continued to shape the trajectory and profile of
collective action. Changes in citizen action, organization and claims-
making through the ensuing phases of the controversy emerge, in large
part, as responses to the Anny's maneuvering' withitl the institutional
requisites of ~EPA and the EIS guidelines toward emphasizing debate
on the technical feature's of the disposal program. As institutional
o~portunities ~or affecting decisions made on the disposal program
shifted, collective action, organization and claims-making began to be
tr~sformed as well. These transformations would recursively affect the
actions of the Anny and other agencies of the state.
During 1989 Concerned Citizens and Common Ground were in a
~ait-and~see ~ode while the Anny began the process of developing the
site-specific impact statements. But, new influences, seemingly far
~emoved from the local protest over weapons disposal, began to
ln~ue~ce .the controversy. -As U.S.- Soviet relations began to thaw in the
~d-elghnes, agreements were reached by the Reagan administration to
Withdraw th~ NATO sto~kpile' of chemical weapons from Europe by
1992. .Also, m 1987 RUSSia had initiated a series of policy reversals, one
of ~hich was to tenninate their production of chemical munitions
(Robinson 1993). Although no workable disposal system was in place,
the govemments tentatively agreed in 1989 to reduce their chemical
weapons stockpiles 80% to 90% over a ten year period beginning in 1992
and to cease further production. The agreement established ties between
the two superpowers on the issue of chemical weapons disarmament, It
also .demons~~ted .further discrepancies between federal level policy-
making and cmzen interests at local and state levels. Concerned Citizens
Common Ground and others had not opposed the ends of destroying the
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regarding the human and technological inadequacies of the program.
These vulnerabilities provided opponents added opportunities to further
consolidate political support and indications of new political allies began
to emerge. to .
Coalitions and Strategic Transfonnations
As the controversy moved into the 1990's, opposition to the U.S.
disposal program began to expand as multiple sites implicated in the
Anny's continued to organize. 11 In light of the opposition's failure, thus
far, to fundamentally alter the Anny's program, leaders in Common
Ground began to discuss the political effects of national and international
. organizing to oppose chemical weapons incineration. Debate among
members of Concerned Citizens and Common Ground was contentious,
but in 1990 two members of Common Ground founded a non-profit
organization, the Kentucky Environmental Foundation (KEF). KEF
was intended to provide financial and infonnational support to local
groups at other sites implicated in the disposal .program. The
organizational changes in Kentucky would prove influential in expanding
political opportunities. New information, resources and other forms of
support provided a foundation for citizens' groups at other sites to
organize, gain influence among political officials and create multiplepoints
of access to local, state and federal-level policy-making processes. The
expansion in channels of communication and access to officials, across
localities, enhanced citizens' influence on political actions at multiple
levels of the state.
. The Anny's ability to effectively bound debate over the Site-Specific
EIS prompted the Concerned Citizens and Common Ground toward
strategies for assembling new forms of evidence that would counter the
Anny's push for incineration as the technology of choice. Citizen leaders
in Common Ground and KEF also began to establish new coalitions and
10 In A~gust 1990,dissatisfied with the earlier GAO report, SenatorJohn Glenn (D-Ohio)
and Representatives John Conyers (D-Mich.) and Earl Hutto (D-FIa.) initiated a follow-up
review. The new GAO 'study concluded that the Johnston Atoll facility (and the entire
disposal program) was over-budget and delayed because of technical and organizational
difficulties rather than the citizens opposition. The report cited contractor malfeasance,
overcharges and poor monitoring of the facility's construction as important factors in the
process. Earlier cost estimates for the project were also recalculated, showing increases of
over $190million for the Johnston Island facility alone.
11 In addition to Indiana, Maryland and the Pacific Islands, organized opposition to the
disposal program had expanded to include the sites in Alabama, Arkansas, Utah and Oregon.
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explore new strategies for influencing and gaining political allies at
multiple levels of the state ~d across l~calities. .Co~mon Groun~
entered an established coalition of national ann-toxics and ann-
incineration groups in 1990. The new networks expanded Common
Ground's and KEF's access to information and experts ~d c~eat~d
symbolic ties with established national organizations. But, as 1~ .typlCal U1
many community-based technical controversi~s, Concerned Citizens and
Common Ground still retained much of their local f~cus ~rown .and
Masterson- Allen 1995). Excluding on-site incineration ~ Madison
County from the Army's plans and emp~~izing ~ansportan~n of ~e
Kentucky stockpile to the Tooele, Utah facility remained the pnmary attn
of the Madison County groups.
Citizen strategy showed signs of transformation at the en~. of 1990.
During the first six years of the controversy the Conc~rned C~t1Zens .and
Common Ground had been consistently engaged m reaaz~e actions
conditioned by opportunities provided by NEPA..regulat1o~s and
associated public meetings arranged by the Army, political ?~fiClalS and
the publicly-funded study groups. But now, ra~er than. wamng for the
Army or political officials to call another p~blic me.eoog, Concerned
Citizens and Common Ground organized their own U1 October 1990.
With the help of Greenpeace, the groups brought. two internatio.n~y
renowned experts on incineration, toxic waste disposal and dioxin
contamination who advanced highly critical, technical analyses of the
disposal program and spoke of possible alternatives t~ ~nc~eration. The
experts supported the opposition's position by le~1lmat1l1g co.~o~
claims with new, technical information, The centerpiece of the citizens
action repertoire, the public meeting, was preserved in fo~ b~t the
content had been altered. The meeting indicated an opposition in the
process of refining its repertoire in pursuit of more pro-active, solution-
oriented claims-making and actions.
Further transformation in the citizens' strategy was apparent at the
Anny's first scoping meeting for the Site-~peci~c E~S in .April 1~91.
Concerned Citizens and Common Ground, in conjunction With technic~
experts, environmental groups and the Kentucky R~sources .~ouncil,
systematically constructed a series of arguments precisely detailing the
citizens' oppositional stance. Almost 1,000 people heard the ~onc~~ed
Citizens and Common Ground leaders present arguments titled The
Citizens'Viewpoint". As a KEF member explained,
['The Citizens' Viewpoint'1 was the first time that ~e citizens put t~gether their
views in a very aware kind of way [and] dealt With the alternatives that .are
available according to data from Greenpeace...and other experts (interview
5/8/95).
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The citizens' were modifying the repertoire as new forms of action
were combined with older, more familiar fOnDS. The position paper was
a new addition to the public meeting and provided an important means
for e~pressing the collective. identity of. ~e opposition, strengthening
lobbying efforts and expanding the political salience of their claims.
~so? tec~ical kno~ledge gained locally and through resources located
~lthm their ~xpandtng ~etwork ?f affiliations was increasing and being
mcorporated into the chums-making and actions of the citizens groups.
Spurred on by the internal leadership, Common Ground and KEF
ha~ t~en the lead roles in organizing citizen opposition. Despite some
obJe~tJ.ons by the Concerned Citizens cadre, they had begun to promote
a national ~~cus a~ they more seriously considered the political influence
that a coalition w~th the ~ther sites could provide. The Department of
~efense had provided an tmportant precursor to this new emphasis when
It held the 1990 5.Y.mposi~m o~ the Environment that drew representatives
from e~ch of. the ~~ght sites involved in the disposal program together.
Interaction With cinzens from other sites obliged the Madison County
delegates to r~consider their not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) position
under new ~t~cumstances. The Madison County representatives
enc~untered citizens opposing incineration at the very sites that would
receive the stockpile if their call for transportation was successful.
I~ November 1991 the coalition, designated the Chemical Weapons
Wo~king Group (hereafter noted as the Working Group), became a
reality. ~~ or~zed a conference that drew 25 delegates from
proposed mcineranon sites in Maryland, Alabama, Indiana, Colorado,
Utah and Oregon, representatives from the Asian Council of Indigenous
P~oples and lea~e~ of a Russian anti-incineration group. Proceeding
with ~e new addi~on to the local repertoire, the Working Group drafted
a position paper titled "The International Citizens' Accords on Chemical
~ea~ons Dis~os~.tt Us~g technical data assembled from experts
Within the anti-toxics coalition, the Accords proclaimed incineration and
other open-ended disposal systems (as opposed to fully contained or
"1 d I tt
• C ose - ooP. systems) unacceptable and called for expanded 'citizen
mvolvement 1t1 developing alternative solutions.
The first conference of the Working Group signaled decisive
changes for ~~ most ac~ve of the Kentucky opposition groups. Yet
Co~cerned Ctozens remained focused on the option of transportation,
which was expresse.d ~s both a matter of representing their constituency
and one of strategtc importance. As a long-time Concerned Citizens
member explained,
When we play NIMBY we ~ean NIMBY. Our responsibility is to Madison
County and Central Kentucky and we are going to go down with the ship. We
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(Concerned Citizens) have always wanted [the option of transportation] to
remain open ... and we haven't changed a bit in that (interview 12/28/94).
But Common Ground and KEF were now the most active and
influential groups involved in the controversy. Their primary focus had
turned toward federal level decision-making and the formation of the
Working Group was being touted as the most politically viable means for
affecting this level. Consequently, as a commitment to solidarity was
made with groups at the other: sites, the NIMBY stance lost much of its
fonner allure to Common Ground and I<EF.
A national and international focus began to crystallize and a variety
of new strategies for challenging the Army's disposal plan were
considered. Locally focused actions were being recast and the repertoire
of action expanded. The challenge began to resemble a social movement
in Tilly's (1978) and Tarrow's (1994) sense of a sustained series of
interactions between people claiming common purposes and solidarity
and national authority and opponents. Community-based actions were
beginning to give way to more broadly focused campaigns as the leading
organizations of the movement emphasized the need to fully engage
federal decision-making processes. But unlike Tarrow's and Tilly's
common emphases on the extra-institutional actions of movements, the
citizens' challenge had emerged and remained oriented primarily towards
formalized, institutional .mechanisms for access to participation ill
decisions concerning the program.
Expanding Opportunities and New Vulnerabilities
By 1992 KEF and the Working Group, in conjunction with
organizations and experts within their expanding network of affiliations,
had begun to marshal the types of technical evidence that the Army had
claimed could prompt significant modifications in the entire disposal
program. Earlier mechanical problems, operator errors and
organizational malfeasance at both the Tooele and Johnston Atoll
facilities had provided grounds for highly critical claims against the
project. Technical evidence from official reports about the incidents also
offered strong bases for arguing against incineration.12 Moreover, the
12 For example, KEF and Greenpeace publicized the Army's report on the first test phase
of the Johnston Atoll facility. The report, carried out by the MITRE Corporation,
concluded that although numerous violations of environmental regulations had occurred, the
Johnston Atoll operations were sufficient for the test phase. KEFs and Greenpeace's
evaluation of the MITRE report found that numerous technical problems and operational
oversights had resulted in alarms, designed to activate in the event of a chemical accident or
release, being triggered 165 times during the test period. Less than a month after the MITRE
study was released, a fire at the johnston Atoll facility further con finned the opposition's
concerns.
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transfonnation in the citizens' stance from exclusively advocating
transportation to supporting alternative technologies appeared effective.
Evaluations of the disposal program by the opposition's experts and
associated data suggesting the workability of several alternatives
introduced new, technical fOnDS of discourse and claims-making into the
debates surrounding the controversy problematizing the conclusions of
the Army's previous environmental impact statements. Technical
evi~~nce and the rhetoric of alternative technologies were salient among
political leaders and compelled responses at various levels, further
expanding political opportunities for the citizens' opposition.
By June 1992 citizens gained their first access to a captive
Congressional audience when members of KEF were invited to testify at
a federal hearing on the disposal program. Federal level support
continued when both the General Accounting Office and the Office of
Technological Assessment recommended to Congress that the Army give
further consideration of alternative technologies. The recommendations
prompted Congress to direct the Army to engage the alternatives issue.
Congress deferred $9.1 million originally slated for the disposal program
from the 1993 Defense Authorization Act and the accompanying
Defense Appropriations Bill and prohibited any site preparation or
construction until the completion of the Army's review. The expansion
of contention to multiple sites involved in the program had sharpened
officials' consideration of the issues involved. Combined with the
movement's attempts to engage federal-level decision-making processes,
citizens had succeeded in altering the legislative agenda toward
consideration of their nascent solution-oriented approach. .
The delays in the disposal program prompted Common Ground to
proclaim 1993 as the "Year of Pause" (Common Sense 12/92). Efforts
were made during this period to formalize the inter-organizational
structure of the opposition groups·. Three distinct tiers now
complemented each other in focus and action. Local groups at the sites
(e.g. Common Ground and Concerned Citizens) comprised the first tier
focused on maintaining local community-based participation and action
on the issue. The Kentucky Environmental Foundation (KEF), the
second tier, provided fiscal and strategic support serving as an
informational hub and the coordinating body for the local groups
comprising the Working Group. The Working Group represented the
third tier and the national and international face of the opposition. This
loosely-coupled inter-organizational structure enhanced the opposition's
capacity to address multiple dimensions of the political environment
among levels and across localities of the state. The inter-organizational
arrangement also enhanced the groups' capacities to extend and
transform the action repertoire and amplify the opposition's political
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influence by creating a unified front, while maintaining the relatively
autonomy of groups at each level.
At its second conference in April 1993, the Working Group
maintained its focus on alternative technologies and produced another
position paper consisting of a broad-ranging list of preferred
congressional actions towards the Army's program. But, on February 7,
1994, almost exactly a decade after the Anny announced its baseline
plan, the National Research Council released ~ts ~eport on altemati~e
technologies advising the Anny to proceed with its plans for on-~lte
incineration recommending only that the facilities employ new pollution
control devices (National Research Council 1994).
Local groups, KEF and the Working Group criticized the report for
what was seen as an improper evaluation of long-term health risks, lack
of objectivity in its selection of data and outside influences. Disputes. of
this type, between technical experts and supporters of specific
technologies, are central to technical controversies. Definitive scienti~c
conclusions are rare (Mazur 1981; Levine 1982). Consequently, allies
and supporters for all sides can often be found. Out~omes often r~st on
the selection of data used in the analysis. The key point of contention of
the report was the National Research Council's evaluation of the
condition of the stockpile. The National Research Council had selected
information from the Army's 1988 Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement that indicated the weapons in Madison County were
deteriorating and stability was assured only through 2002. An Anny-
commissioned study by the MITRE Corporation (1993) assured stability
through 2019. From these studies, the National Research Council's
committee concluded that the risk associated with continued storage was
"the same or greater than the annual risk due to disposal" (National
Research Council 1994, p.121). The conclusion supported the Anny's
push for incineration at the time, but the issue of deterioration and risk
would soon reappear as a central vulnerability in the Army's stance. The
Army presented its final conclusions on alternative technologies to
Congress in April 1994. Its decision to continue with on-site incineration
was expected. There were also stringent legal and regulatory obstacles at
various levels of the state, however, that the Anny would first have to
overcome. Indeed, Kentucky now had some of the nation's toughest
protection standards for hazardous waste incineration. Opponents saw
little possibility in the Anny meeting these standards.
Following the Army's report the major decisions regarding the
budget and time-tables for the program now moved firmly into the
congressional arena. It was uncertain whether the citizens' claims had the
desired affect of altering the push for on-site incineration. The
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uncertainty was sustained through August. Congress approved $21
million for research and development of alternative technologies, but
both the House Anned Services and Defense Appropriation Committees
were recommending the appropriation of almost $575 million for further
construction of incinerators in 1995. Discrepancies in the claims and
actions among officials and agencies of the state remained a central
component to the opposition's critical claims regarding the disposal
program.
The movement's ensemble of critical claims were amplified during
the latter months of 1994. In this pivotal period for the future of the
disposal program, two crucial vulnerabilities emerged that boded well for
the opposition and cast new doubts. on the Anny's rhetoric about the
efficiency of incineration and the entire disposal program. The first
involved the purported deterioration rate of the stockpile. In August
1994, the Anny released the preliminary findings of a new risk
assessment that showed previous calculations of the deterioration rates
were off by more than 100 years. Common G~oW1d, KEF and the
Working Group quickly proclaimed the Anny's prior emphasis on
deterioration rates as misinfonnation used to bolster the push for
incineration. KEF's executive-director claimed,
If the Anny cannot be correct in a simple mathematical problem, how can we
expect them to oversee an immensely complicated and dangerous project such as
the disposal program (interview 8/9/94)? They have misrepresented the realities
of the situation and that is unconscionable (Herald-Leader 8/11/94).
The second event involved the entire incineration program. In early
September, new allegations about the disposal program surfaced from
~teve ~ones, a highly-commended safety officer charged with safety-
inspections at the Tooele, Utah chemical weapons incinerator. Jones,
fired following his completion of an internal safety audit of the plant,
charged the site with over 1,000 safety violations. Problems included
lack of s~fety tr~g,insu~cientmonitoring of stack emissions, venting
of chemical agent directly mto the atmosphere and defects in the overall
design of the plant itself. The incident piqued concern from Utah to
Kentucky, Russia and the Pacific Islands. Utah's Governor Michael O.
Leavitt and U.S. Senator Orin Hatch of Utah initiated a state-level
investigation into the safety risks at the Tooele plant. The allegations
were too controversial for the Anny to ignore. Officials quickly
announced the beginning of an Anny investigation regarding Jones'
charges, ~d the House Armed Services' Oversight and Investigations
subcomnuttee began another investigation.
.. Prior to the new deterioration report and Jones' allegations, the
citizens' prospects for altering the incineration component of the disposal
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program had appeared to be waning. Altho~gh, supportive allies and
policies at multiple levels of the s.tate were evident and ~nds had been
appropriated for further alternatives .research,. the .N~non~ Research
Council's recommendations supporting on-site incmeranon made
congressional approval for. ~urrent c~ntinuati?n of.the. disposal program
seemed likely. But, the critical scrutiny and mvesnganons that emerged
around the recent and timely events had, again, altered the political
atmosphere surrounding the controversy.
Congressional scrutiny, erroneous claims of. deterioratio~ and Jone.s'
whistleblowing also brought increased local, regional and national media
attention to the controversy. In an attempt to capitalize on these
changes, Common Ground, KEF and the Working Group propo~ed a
new form of action that combined forms selected from the available
cultural repertoire. As a display of international solidarity against
chemical weapons incineration, the groups organized "The International
Day for Safe Disposal." Marches, rallies, demonstrations, press
conferences and town meetings, arranged by citizens' groups at each
proposed disposal site in the continental U.S., Hawaii and Russia, were
held on September 25. The emphasis on "safe disposal" captured the
fundamental aim of Common Ground, KEF and the Working Group.
The goal of weapons disposal was not the central issue of dispute ~or
was the location of disposal expressed as the focus. Rather elauns
centered on the means (incineration) proposed by the Anny. In light of
the alternatives available the NIMBY stance had been dropped by most
groups involved, incineration was touted as unacceptable and. alternative
solutions were being advocated. Members of the Working Group
expressed hope that this new form of action and their ~olution-oriented
approach would further s?lidify P?litical s.upport.at ~ul~ple l~vels of the
state and warrant international policy-making against incmeranon,
By the end of 1994 the actions of KEF and the Working C?r?up
were primarily being directed towards influencing federal le~el decision-
making processes pertaining to the program. According to key
participants in the groups, to be effective at this ~evel .deman~ed
increasingly intense, full-time attention to events on Capitol Hill, detailed
communication and coordination within the Working Group,13 and
communication with and continued support of political allies at multiple
13 The Working Group now had "33 member groups in the United .States, Russia and
among the Pacific Islands. In addition, 77 organizations have offiCIally, endors~d the
Working Group's anti-incineration position. Among these are the International Union of
Pure and Applied Chemistry, Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous ~~ste, GreenLa~,
Greenpeace, Government Accountability Project, Sierra Club, Physlcl~ns. for Social
Responsibility and the Pacific Island Association ofNon-Government Organizations.
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levels of the state and action by citizens at the local level. But since its
inception, KEF had been faced with lack of time and personnel to focus
on all the political dimensions and issues pertinent to the controversy.
They had simply become too numerous to be dealt with on a consistent
basis.
Ironically, the important points of leverage that had been gained as a
result of the movement's expansion and new increasing emphasis on
affecting the federal legislative agenda had created problems in sustaining
action within the communities from which the movement had emerged.
With the exception of the "International Day for Safe Disposal" local
participation had declined. Speaking of the Madison County situation, a
KEF member explained,
People in this community...have lost ownership of the infonnation and the issue.
Because before when it was just Common Ground people were gathering
together to look through information, to figure out how to get the info, to make
contacts, to brainstorm on ideas and strategic moves, to write letters, hold public
meetings and things like that Now we have just one organization (KEF) or four
people who are doing that on a full-time basis...its like their little piece is gone.
People don't have direct involvement anymore. And that's something we are
trying to change. But it's been difficult to figure out how to do both. How do
you conduct this international movement plus keep things very local (interview
1/4/95).
Movement leaders were faced with the dilemma of maintaining an
organizational structure "sufficiently robust to stand up to opponents,
but flexible enough to...[continue] draw[ing] on energies at the base"
(farrow 1994, p.136). The executive director of KEF succinctly stated
the core problem they faced in late-1994. "The big issue will be won or
lost on the national level, but it cannot be won without good organization
[and active participation] at the local level" (Common Ground minutes
11/9/94).
New Solutions or the Status Quo?
Dual possibilities had emerged with the movement's tum towards
emphasizing dimensions of federal action and opportunities. The
controversy had been pushed into Congress, the highest level of political
decision-making. Now, the fate of the disposal program and incineration
rested on the extent to which Congress would approve the program and
allocate the necessary resources. Although the ends of disposal would
remain intact, extensive Congressional opposition to the disposal
program could result in support of the strategies advocated by the
movement: alterations in the timeline for disposal, termination of
incineration as the technology of choice and intensive development of
alternative technologies. On the other hand, there was not another level
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of the state to which debate and decision-m~ng on the program could
be pushed. Congressional support fo.r ~e disposal p~~gram could l~~ve
the movement facing a r~pidly constncttng set of polill~al OP?O~Il~s.
For decisions made at this level would shape, and possibly~s e
olitical effectiveness of the movement at other levels by clos~g off
1.rther points of debate through new or redefined Congressionally-
. 14imposed mandates for action.
Despite this, opponents had reason for optimism that C~ngressi?nal
support for alternatives would be fo~coming. Steve Jo~~s allegations
were supported by an independent audit of the Too~le facility that found
3,016 hazards relating to design flaws ~d ?per~tlons problems~ o~er
1,000 of which were designated as presenting lInm1lle~t, cat~str?phic risk
of explosions or nerve agent releases. Anny mvesnganons ~so
confirmed many of his charges. The conclusions captured .the attentl~n
of military leaders, Congressional offici~s and the national media,
including the NewYork Times and the Washzngton Post.
The political effects of Jones' allegations ~ere sharpened as further
criticisms about the disposal program surfaced 10 early 1995. In March a
former cost-analyst at the Johnston Atoll facility, Charles Oughton, went
public with criticisms directed toward the program's cost overruns. He
explained,
[The program] has never met a cost estimate or produc~on goal since it started
ten years ago. Every time there's a problem, [the Anny] simply changers].~e co.st
estimates or production schedules. This has to stop. It's a waste of billions In
taxpayer dollars (Richmond Register 3/28/95).
The General Accounting Office (GAO 1995) was als~ critical of the
Anny's handling of the program, reporting that cost estunate.s .for the
program had risen since 1985 from $1.7 billion to over $11 billion and
charged that the Anny's ~gure was understated by, as ~~ch as $~48
million. These conclusions furthered opponents P?htlcally-salient
criticisms regarding the program. The Working ~~~p, linked the ~ost­
overruns to the popular rhetoric of fiscal res~onslbility that had gamed
salience among many politicians. A Wor~g .Gro~p spokespe~on
1 " d "At a time when the American public and their representativesexp arne , .
are demanding fiscal responsibility, this program represents the epitome
of open-ended wasteful spending" (Herald-Leader 3/28/95).
14 Of course there were other possibilities as well. Most likelyw~ that Congre~s wou,ld
, rtive of continued research and development of alternative technologies while
remain suppo iabili f hi' ld be
. inz th IItn'1o on its current tea)'ectorv until the v t tty 0 tea ternatrves coucontinu g e progrA&U -J
sufficiently proven.
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In 1996 the National Defense Authorization Act directed the House
of Representatives to hold hearings addressing the current status of the
disposal program and measures to reduce overall cost and minimize
environmental risks. On July 13, 1995 Anny spokespersons, political
officials and representatives from KEF, the Working Group and the
Kentucky Citizens' Advisory Commission testified before a House
National Security subcommittee. Drawing on prior expert testimony and
scientific data gained through the opposition's growing network of
environmental groups, technical advisors and scientists, citizen
representatives presented detailed technical support for their highly
critical claims of the disposal program and the potential of alternative
technologies.P Ironically, some House members even resurrected the
politically contentious option of reducing costs by transporting stockpiles
to existing facilities. Following the hearing, the House subcommittee
approved a Department of Defense plan for establishing a study group
made up of political officials and representatives from the Anny,
Department of Defense, Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program, National Research Council and citizen groups including the
Working Group and Citizen Advisory Commissions. Yet another point
of access to officials and agencies with authority at multiple levels and
across localities of the state had emerged.
The hearing reportedly was seen as an indication of expanding
interest of Congress in the program, practical action, and positive
political shifts toward the citizens' opposition to the disposal program.
Craig Williams, spokesperson for the Working Group, defined the study
group as a step forward in the controversy. "[The hearing] wasn't a home
run, but we are definitely on the field and in the game. The dynamics of
the program are clearly changing" (Berea Citizen 7/27/95). At the
Working Group's 1995 meeting delegates released to media outlets and
Working Group member groups, the most sophisticated and extensively
documented position paper yet developed by the citizens- and circulated
within Congress.16 Following the conference and an associated press
15 New i~fonnation on alternatives was emerging both from the Army's investigations as
well as outside the Department ofDefense research labs. Advances in technologies based on
a numb.er of chemical and biological neutralization processes (Yang 1995), Molten Metal
Pyrolosis, Hydrogenation and Electrochemical Oxidation (Department of Defense 1996).
16 "The Citizens' Solution to the Costly Mistake of Incineration" detailed information on
the cos,toverruns of the disposal program, public health issues, problems with the Chemical
~tockplle E~ergency Preparedness Plan, safety considerations at the Tooele depot, legal
Issues associated with the program and the most current data on· alternative technologies for
disposal.
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conference and Congressional briefing, delegates were described as
feeling that "Congress [was] beginning to realize that [the citizens] are
looking for solutions, not trying to delay the program" (Common Sense
7/95). As one member put it, "we are no longer being dismissed as
obstructionists with no hope of really impacting the status quo"
(Common Sense 7/95).17
The movement's emphasis on action directed toward the federal
level had provoked decision-making at the highest level of the state. U.S.
policy on chemical weapons disposal would follow from Congressional
actions toward the program. The disposal issue was, however, also an
international concern. The tentative 1989 bi-lateral agreement between
Russia and the U.S. on chemical demilitarization had resulted in close
financial and political ties that would shape the fate of the two programs.
These ties provided the movement another dimension along which to
expand participation, orient claims-making and offer solutions. Claims
could now emphasize the broad, indeed global, implications of the
United States' approach to chemical weapons disposal.
Aware of these implications, the Working Group and CEC
International Partners held the first Russian-American Non-
Governmental Organization Summit on Chemical Weapons Disposal in
Saratov, Russia on October 20-22, 1995. Following the pattern of prior
Working Group conferences, representatives from chemical weapons
disposal sites in Russia and delegates from all the U.S. sites met to create
a position paper, the "International Citizens Declaration on Chemical
Weapons." The Declaration emphasized the need for citizen
participation in decisions regarding disposal and the viability of
alternative technologies. These emphases were punctuated by Russia's
decision in 1995, prior to the Summit, to reject a disposal program based
on incineration in favor of chemical neutralization technology. As
spokespersons for the Working Group had remarked before the
conference, "The irony is that the United States will subsidize a Russian
neutralization program that has support in this country (U.S.), while
relying on an incineration plan that has virtually no political support"
(Herald-Leader 5/16/95). The Summit was central in the movement's
17 As 1995 proceeded the opposition maintained a guarded optimism. It was expected that
the new information about the Armys operation of the disposal program would have
important effects on 1996 Defense legislation and subsequent funding of the disposal
program. Legal obstacles to the advancement of the disposal program based on incineration
have been pursued at all sites. Lawsuits by the Working Group, the Pacific Asia Council of
Indigenous Peoples and the Institute for the advancement of Hawaiian Affairs. ?ave been
filed opposing reissuance of EPA operating permits for the Johnston Atoll facility. Steve
Jones also named the Armyas a defendant in his illegal termination lawsuit being considered
by the u.S. Labor Department.
157
MARS/Soda' Thought & Research
efforts to magnify the importance of the ties between the countries and
politically exploit the discrepancies between the programs to encourage
Congressional action towards alternative technologies for the U.S.
disposal program.
Although alternative technologies were being developed, the Anny
had maintained its focus on incineration citing Congressional deadlines
and the unprov:en qualities of the alternatives for a large-scale disposal
program. But, in June 1996,18 it appeared that incineration opponents
wou~d get .Congressional action that would pave the way to the thorough
consideration of alternatives to incineration they had called for.
Kentucky Senator Wendell" Ford announced his plans to introduce
legislation that would halt all current action on developing incineration
facilities while the Anny and the Department of Energy conducted a
three year, $60 million pilot program for testing alternative technologies.
The legislation would effectively eliminate the current timeline for the
disposal program. KEF and the Working Group were very supportive,
calling the move ..."the greatest thing that has ever happened in this
program ifwe can get it through" (Register 6/10/96, emphasis added).
. The remark was prescient. The Senate gave full approval of the plan
10 June. Congress dismantled its central provisions three months later.
Rather than requiring a pilot program to test alternatives, the bill that
emerged from House and Senate negotiations instead gave the
Department of Defense one year to study whether such a pilot program
was needed. But, three days later Congress passed legislation introduced
by an~ther Kentucky Senator, Mitch McConnell. McConnell's program
authonzed Congress to spend $40 million to investigate alternatives in a
pilot program very similar to the one proposed by Ford. "The plan would
also prevent the Anny from beginning construction of an incinerator
facility in Kentucky until six months after a report on the pilot program
had been presented to Congress. The plans proposed by the Kentucky
Senators were similar in many respects except that ~lcConnell's
legislation omitted Senator Ford's proposal to eliminate the
Congressional timeline for weapons disposal. While reasons for one
being approved over the other are numerous, this may have been a key
compromise that facilitated the bill's passage. McConnell's position on
the Appropriations Committee and as one of the negotiators who worked
out the final version of the bill was also vital to its passage. Ford had
been excluded from closed-door negotiations.
18 Common Ground, KEF and the. Working Group had maintained lobbying efforts at
local, state and federal levels and continued to pursue numerous legal obstacles to the
disposal program throughout the first half of 1996.
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This explanation points to an important aspect of the role of political
allies as a dimension of opportunity. The appearance of multiple allies at
each level of the state is a critical indication of potential for effective
collective action. But, the manner in which those allies influence
political processes may be significantly affected by the institutional
positions they control with respect to the issues being addressed.
McConnell's role in negotiations on the bill provided the chance to
clarify and strengthen arguments for the bill's passage. Ford's exclusion
vastly limited this possibility.
It was likely that the omission was also linked to the Anny's actions
on the disposal program, during the time in which Ford's proposal was
being negotiated. On Thursday August 22, 1996 the Tooele, Utah
incineration facility was brought on-line and began destroying agent-
bearing rockets. Two days later a chemical agent leak during processing
was reported and incineration was halted. Precedent had been set. The
Tooele facility was operating, but the future of the United States
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program remained unclear.
As 1996 drew to a close the newest transformation in the
opposition's objectives appeared solid. The fundamental goal of halting
the on-site incineration component of the disposal program and the
emphasis on safe disposal remained. The opposition had moved toward
explicitly and expertly addressing what many participants some have
come to see as the underlying and most fundamental issue of this
extended controversy - developing a framework for citizen participation
in a new democratic politics of technology. The transformation promises
to usher in further phases of the controversy.
Discussion and Implications
Through successive periods of the controversy, the citizens'
challenge to the disposal program has exhibited numerous
transformations in claims-making, forms of action, organizational
structure and the expressed aims of the groups involved. These
transformations emerged, in part, as adaptive responses to changes in
dimensions of political opportunity located at multiple levels of the state
and to vulnerabilities in the actions of the Anny and associated agencies
of the state. On the other hand, political opportunities were, in part,
purposefully sought and developed by the movement groups over several
phases of the controversy. I will now discuss these transformations in
light of what they may explain about the nature of technical controversy
and the state. I also suggest some ways that the concepts used in this
analysis might be refined.
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Contemporary political challengers act to establish a pattern of :
consultation with policy makers and win advantages and favorable policy
decisions (Lo 1992).19 The study of social movements and collective
~ction has. e~phasize~ ~a~ challe~gers predominately employ
unconv~nttonal, extra-mstttuttonal actions that draw primarily on
commuruty-based resources such as time and commitment of citizens
(Lo 1992, pp.235, 238). Undoubtably, community-based resources and
extra-~stitutional .actions have been important in the dispute over the
~hemlcal Stockptle Disposal Program. The controversy over the
disposal program b.eg~ as a local dispute relying on people and
resources located WIthin the local communities surrounding the Blue
Grass ~y Depot in Madison County, Kentucky. But, as I have
empha~lz~d, over the course of the controversy the .actions of citizens
we~e s~gruficantly shaped by i.nfluences .external to the citizens' groups.
GUIdelines b~ed on the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA~ provided ~e .frame~orkwithin which the Anny was required to
pursue unplementanon of the disposal program. NEPA mandates for
public ~eetings ~d citizen participation facilitated the emergence of
l~~al action 0P~OStng the disposal program by providing occasions for
cl~ze~s and political officials to engage the Army, make claims and, in
principle, take .pa~ ~ dec~sion-making regarding the disposal program.
Inde~d, t?ese institutionalized "process~s appeared to provide precisely
the routine, low cost access to ~olicy-makers and decision-making
processes that challengers are said to reference. Consequently,
throughout much of the dispute, citizen's actions focused on
institutionaliifd processes for influencing the trajectory of the .disposal
program.
Foc~sing on dim~nsions of political opportunity in this case suggests
that particular attention should be directed to the location of these
opporrunices among levels, localities, agencies and actors of the state.
As.cmzens, o.fficials, the Anny and other agencies of the state addressed
C~atms regarding ~e disposal program, collective action was differentially
direc.ted and redirected toward the multiple points of access that were
provided by institutionalized channels for participation, sought by
movement groups, and that became available through the actions of
politi~al .allies over the course of controversy. New community
or~zatIons were developed, state agencies and officials directed
attention toward the disposal program and movement action shifted
repeatedly as new, and sometimes unforeseen, transfonnations in the
19 ~o acknowledges that a once a movement is established it can (and often will) consist
of a highly complex blend of challengers and established polity members that draw political
strength and resources from one another.
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controversy emerged.. Early support for citizen concerns by Kentucky
officials at both local and state levels resulted in rigid policy standards. for
weapons disposal at both the local and state level that strengthened
federal requirements and altered the trajectory of the program. Delays in
the disposal program were created and the Anny was obliged to express
consideration of transportation and other possible alternatives. But, the
Draft and Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statements did not
show fundamental changes in the Anny's plans. As the controversy
proceeded, federal level decision-making processes became a primary
target and means of access for the citizens' opposition. The Army's
attempt to limit debate on the program to technical evidence and the
site-specific impact statements, also led to transformations in the actions,
claims and the organizational structure of the movement. As
participation expanded among localities involved in the disposal program,
multiple points of access were used, new political allies were gained at
each level of the state and scrutiny of the program among agencies of the
state intensified. Movement organizers adapted to the expanding
dimensions of opportunity by developing a three-tiered organizational
structure comprised of groups focused on local, national, and eventually
international political processes. The loosely-coupled arrangement
between the local groups, KEF and the Working Group enabled the
opposition to coordinate actions among the different sites and address
the multiple points of access that were gained over the course of the
dispute. Emphasis was also given to maintaining the flexibility and
autonomy of each local organization as strategies for influencing new
allies linked to each site were decided by the movement organizations at
those sites.
The conceptualization of influential allies as an element of
opportunity consists of several dimensions. The sheer number of
political allies 'supporting a movement may be important for moving the
issue(s) being disputed into political discourse and provoking scrutiny.
More importantly, leverage may be enhanced when the allies occupy
positions at multiple levels of the state WId across localities. This
configuration provides the movement several points of access through
which to influence political policies and regulations affecting the issue
under dispute. This appears to be especially important in technical
controversies involving projects planned by agencies of the state to be
implemented at several sites or that involve conditions relevant to a
number of separate locales. Formidable legal and other regulatory
obstacles to developing a controversial project may be erected by allies at
each level and at each locale. But, the potential is even more complex.
Another important consideration is the different means by which the
positions occupied by those allies allow them to influence political
processes surrounding the issue. As the failure of Senator Ford's
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legislation and the passage of Senator McConnell's demonstrated, there
are important variations of some allies' influence. These differences
deserve scrutiny as they may have far reaching effects on further actions
and developments over the course of controversy.
Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1994) lead us to expect that an expansion
in state authority over areas not fonnally regulated, provides
opportunities for challengers. The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 has done just this. Tarrow then seems to suggest that as the state
ext~nds authority, it becomes a "fulcrum" for claims and challenges
agamst autonomous actors outside its institutional boundaries. This case
suggests that Tarrow's description of the state as "fulcrum" through
which claims against autonomous actors outside its institutional
boundaries are made should be extended. The dispute over the disposal
program demonstrates that the laws and regulations of the state may also
be used to counter actions lvithin the boundaries of institutional politics
by allowing movements, actors and agencies of the state to challenge and
constrain the .actions and goals of other agencies of the state. Hence, a
more inclusive conceptualization. of the linkage between dimensions of
political opportunities and the state should reflect the possibility of
conflict and struggles between aims and goals of officials and agencies of
the state itself. The manner in which these tensions develop may be
central for understanding major effects on the organization, direction and
endurance of movement action. Over the course of this controversy
NEPA provided the framework for the actions of both the Anny and the
movement. But the conflicts that emerged among officials and agencies
of the state strongly conditioned the action of the movement to be
directed primarily through institutional channels. Potential opportunities
through which to affect political processes repeatedly opened. This
conclusion broadens the already complex scope of interests and actions
that should be considered in examining citizen-state interaction.
Political opportunities were not, however, the only factors external
to challengers that have been important for sustaining movement action
and access to policy-making processes. Human errors and technical
problems associated with the disposal program emerged throughout the
controversy, leaving the. Anny vulnerable to highly critical claims by
citizens and officials. Claims emerged regarding inadequacies of the
Anny's technology and the plausibility of alternative technologies and
were combined with growing concerns over Anny negligence and
citizens' exclusion from effective participation in the decisions regarding
the program. Taken together, these claims helped widen the dimensions
of opportunity open to the challengers. Officials and regulatory agencies
were prompted to further assess the Anny's management of the disposal
program which, in tum, pushed political discourse and scrutiny into areas
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previously unexamined. New allies were gained as evidence of technical
problems and cost overruns mounted and as new solutions were
advanced by the opposition groups and their experts.
Actions, claims-making and goals of movements are constructed on
shifting and emergent grounds (Weller 1994). "One encounter with
authority [is] succeeded by other encounters, each with a different
effect. .." (Turner and Killian [1957] 1987, p.25S). Consequendy, forms
of action, claims-making, organization and goals are subject to change
throughout the life of the movement (Walton 1992; Weller 1994). In this
case, the flexible organizational structure of the movement and
adaptations in aims and actions have helped the challengers to' sustain
interaction with the Anny and political officials at multiple levels and
across locales of the state. The expansion of the opposition's repertoire
of action and claims-making, in conjunction with the ability of the
movement to combine different elements according to the actions and
opportunities presented by the Anny, political allies and dictates of state
policies, has given the opposition much of its potency. The formation of
the Chemical Weapons Working Group had particularly significant
effects on the dispute. The national coalition enhanced the political
saliency of the opposition while altering the solutions advocated and
actions pursued on the local level. Combined with the Anny's attempt to
limit debate to technical considerations following the Final Programmatic
EIS, the movement began to employ experts and technical claims of the
workability of alternatives to incineration. Consequently, the Working
Group and others began to advance a position that no longer merely
opposed the Anny's project, but instead emphasized solutions to solve the
problem of chemical weapons disposal. This approach was consistent
with earlier claims of a lack of public participation in decisions regarding
the disposal program. The goal of disposal was not at issue. Instead, it
was the means by which the weapons were to be destroyed and the
manner in which decisions regarding the program had been made.
Combined with the repeated technical problems at the Tooele and
Johnston Atoll sites, these claims of alternative means increased support
among political officials and other allies and new policies affecting the
trajectory of the disposal program were developed.
Charles Perrow (1984) argues that the increasing complexity of high-
risk technologies, especially those with catastrophic potential such as
chemical weapons incineration, makes these technologies prone to
mechanical failures and human errors. The Anny's technical difficulties
shouldn't be surprising as Perrow (1984) suggests they are quite
"normal." As in this case, technical problems and expert opposition may
be advanced as opportunities for influencing political allies and arousing
public concerns (Walsh 1986) by exposing proponents of technologies to
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critical claims based on these problems as well as on the escalating costs
of redesigned technical programs. The claims can, in tum, play an
important part in facilitating and sustaining participation in movement
actions -during these disputes by exposing empirical evidence of
inadequacies in the technology and planning of these projects. But, in
addition to the technical and operator problems that left the Anny open
to critical claims-making, Anny officials were repeatedly inconsistent in
their stance towards alternatives to on-site incineration. Positions
wavered between the workability of transportation and the "necessity" of
on-site incineration. The apparent indecisiveness, inconsistencies, and
contradictions among Army officials and associated agencies of the state
repeatedly entered the discourse and claims-making of the opposition.
The disposal program was charged with being disorganized and
ineffective and the Anny as indifferent to public concerns. In light of
these issues I suggest an additional consideration to Walsh's useful idea.
That is, for targets in technical controversies maintenance of, at least, the
appearance of command, competence and control over a technology is
significant for shaping the trajectory of disputes. When these disputes
involve agencies of the state, organizational consistency and preparedness
during processes such as those circumscribed by NEPA and in
interactions with authorities, officials and citizens, can be pivotal to the
rise and fall of controversy.
Although the foci of political opportunities, target vulnerabilities and
repertoires of action do not capture the immense complexity and
dynamism of this controversy, the concepts do illuminate important
factors shaping action through successive phases of the movement A
question outside of this study that remains is to what degree of political
action must citizens go to advance their claims in the face of programs
such as the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program that carry the potential
of catastrophic consequences. This question is especially salient
regarding technical controversies and the state. Lay challengers may face
the daunting task of marshaling complex technical and scientific data and
experts that support their claims to contest projects proposed by agencies
of the state with vast networks of resources from which to draw upon.
But, outcomes are not necessarily pre-determined by this uneven access
to resources and expertise. Unexpected courses of action may develop.
Target vulnerabilities may emerge as a significant feature of claims-
making and the growth of challenges toward the project. Equipped with
a set of critical claims that suggest numerous inadequacies linked to a
program such as the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, citizens may
work from within institutional channels, exploiting the regulatory
processes to their own ends. Instead of challenges emerging outside the
confines of institutional politics as Tilly, Tarrow, Lo and others appear to
understand the development of movements, protest may emerge and
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remain primarily confined to institutionally mandated channels for
partJ.c1pation. This -certainly does not exclude the possibility of the
emergence of "unconventional," extra-institutional actions. It instead
suggests that the social, political and scientific context of technical
controversies and the state, may place constraints upon and opportunities
for action producing patterns of movement emergence dissimilar to
movements associated with other issues.
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Some scholars place violence as prominent in an earfy stage of a social
movemel1t, whereas others argue that violence is cbaraaenstic of a later
stage. This paper addresses the question of whether there is a specific
movement stage that is particular!J charaaen·i!d I!J violence through an
analYsis of the shi-shi movement (1858-1864). The shi-shi movemelzt
helped create the revolutionary situation which cubnil1ated in Japan's Meiji
Restoration (1868). Violence wasprominent andconsequential in theshi-
shi movement andwasfound throughout the career of the movement. This
stutfy of a single case is by no means suiJicient to claim primary over
existing models of theplace of violence in social movements. The shi-shi
movement, however, signijical1tlY varies from theoretical models that link
violent actions to a specific movement stage.
Social movements have careers. They go through stages as they
emerge, develop, and decline. Scholars have characterized successive
stages of social movements as indicated by the forms of action found in
each stage. Violence is one of the indicators used to identify the action
said to typify particular social-movement stages. In this paper, I examine
the pattern of violence in stages of the shi-shi movement in 19th century
Japan in comparison with two ways in which scholars have linked
violence to phases of social movements.
Violence is one type of action often associated with social
movements. Research on violent actions in social movements mainly
addresses two issues. One line of exploration focuses on the causes of
violent actions. For example, violence has been explained as an effect of
relative deprivation (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962), resource allocations
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall1973, 1993) or political conditions
(Snyder 1979; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1978; Tilly et. al. 1975). The
other issue concerns the phase of a social movement in which violent
